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Interview with Nguyen KhacVien
The following is an abridged version o f one chapter in a 
Vietnamese publication Viet Nam 1980. The whole pamphlet 
is an interview with prominent Vietnamese, intellectual 
N g u y e n  K h a c  V ie n .
World public opinion at the moment is 
focussed on the question of Kampuchea and 
particularly on Viet Nam —  Kampuchea 
relations. How can one assess the situation in 
that country?
The government of the People’s Republic of 
Kampuchea is in complete control of the 
situation there. One year after liberation it 
can be affirmed that the rebirth of this 
country which was literally disintegrated by 
four years of Pol Pot rule is an undeniable 
fact. Six hundred and fifty thousand
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hectares of land have been brought back 
under cultivation and the first harvest has 
already been gathered. Together with 
international aid, which is becoming larger 
and better distributed, this has averted the 
threat of famine. Though there are still 
serious problems in the food supply, this does 
not alter the fact that the alarmist reports 
which appear so frequently in the Western 
press have more to do with psychological 
warfare than with news. The situation has 
become irreversible, in the sense that no force 
in the world is any longer capable of putting 
agents of Beijing or any other power back in 
the saddle in Phnom Penh.
Where does the Heng Samrin government's 
strength come from? In the West it is often 
claimed that this regime is only held up by the 
support of the Vietnamese forces.
The Pol Pot regime, barbaric as it was, was 
unable to prevent the creation of a resistance, 
which began as early as 1975. Though 
forcibly repressed,  this resistance 
nevertheless managed in about mid-1978 to 
form itself into a solid organization, notably 
among officers and political cadres of the 
army. President Heng Samrin is himself one 
of these officers of the Pol Pot army who 
realised that Pol Pot’s political line was 
leading the country straight into total 
extermination. Then the National United 
Front for the Salvation of Kampuchea 
(NUFSK) was set up and the present 
government was formed from this 
organization. The base of the Heng Samrin 
government is this vast opposition to Pol 
Pot’s reign o f terror, it is the grim 
determination of the whole population never 
again to let the agents of Beijing and the 
imperialist powers return to power. For that 
would mean a new massacre followed by 
another war against Viet Nam.
W hy are Vietnamese troops still stationed in 
Kampuchea? And how long will they stay?
The Vietnamese forces came firstly to 
pursue the Pol Pot troops who had attacked 
Viet Nam, and then at the request of the 
NUFSK to help to save the Kampuchean 
people from genocide. Now the routed Pol Pot 
troops have regrouped in Thailand, where 
they are fed and equipped by Beijing. Pro- 
American forces, the Khmer Serei are also 
based in Thailand. The Khmer Rouge and 
Khmer Serei are recruting among the
refugees, and combine to form a real counter­
revolutionary army, which Beijing and 
Washington are trying to get back into the 
country in order to unleash civil war and 
overthrow the government of the People’s 
Republic of Kampuchea. This government, 
which is in the process of consolidating itself, 
asked for help from Viet Nam and an 
agreement was signed in February 1979 
between the two governments. Under the 
terms of this agreement, Vietnamese troops 
will stay in the country until the day when 
the Kampuchean governments asks them to 
withdraw. The day when the Kampuchean 
government will be capable by itself of 
resisting the threat of the pro-Chinese and 
pro-American forces, it will ask the 
Vietnamese forces to leave. All the 
Vietnamese hope fervently that this day will 
come as soon as possible: Vietnamese troops 
will not stay a day longer. But as long as the 
Kampuchean government has not made this 
request, no force in the world can oblige them 
to withdraw. Certain governments have 
pressurized Viet Nam by cutting o ff 
economic aid, China is threatening to make 
war on us. Viet Nam will accept any 
hardship and sacrifice to keep its 
commitments to the Kampuchean people.
W hy such stubbornness? Hasn't Viet Nam  
had enough of war? And isn't aid to 
Kampuchea a very heavy burden?
Viet Nam has to send to Kampuchea 
troops, workers, technicians, doctors, and 
specialists in a variety of fields, to help our 
Kampuchean friends defend and rebuild 
their country. The Pol Pot men destroyed 
even families’ crockery, even school 
stationery. We have had to send foodstuffs, 
medicines, cooking utensils, exercise books, 
pens and pencils, although our people also 
suffer serious shortages of food and goods. 
Our government has no di f f iculty 
convincing the Vietnamese people to make 
these sacrifices, because for every 
Vietnamese person to defend Kampuchea 
and help it to rebuild, is to defend and help 
Viet Nam itself.
It is said that the Vietnam ese and 
Kampuchean peoples are motivated by age- 
old feelings of mutual hostility.
It is true that in past centuries the 
Vietnamese and Kampuchean monardis 
were often, at war. In the 13th century, an 
Angkor king tried on two occasions to invade
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Viet Nam, then from the 17th century 
onwards, Vietnamese kings invaded 
Kampuchea repeatedly and annexed the 
lower part of the Mekong delta. But if one 
goes back through the centuries, it was the 
Thais (formerly called the Siamese) who 
destroyed the Angkor Empire, and not the 
Vietnamese; and the last annexation of 
Kampuchean territory by the Thais was not 
in the 17th century, but in 1940 when with 
Japanese support they took from 
Kampuchea vast areas of Battambang, 
Stung Treng and Kompong Thom provinces. 
Neither the mass media of Beijing, nor those 
of the West mention this age-old hatred 
between Kampucheans and Thais. When 
this ancient hostility between Vietnamese 
and Kampucheans is evoked and when 
attempts are made to keep it going and 
worsen it, this is for precise political 
objectives. Another historical trend which 
has developed since the colonial conquest is 
forgotten, or deliberately ignored: the 
militant solidarity between the Vietnamese 
and Kampuchean peoples in opposition to 
colonialism for the reconquest of their 
independence.
Would you please give us an idea of this 
militant solidarity?
During the war of liberation against the 
French forces,  from 1945 to 1954, 
Kampuchean patriots created a National 
liberation Front and called for the aid of 
Vietnamese troops. So Vietnamese and 
Kampuchean patriots fought side by side for 
many years, yet the Vietnamese forces 
withdrew as soon as the French colonialists 
retreated from Kampuchea. From 1954 to 
1970, the Sihanouk government succeeded in 
maintaining its independence and 
neutrality. But in 1970 Sihanouk was 
overthrown by the pro-American 
government of Lon Nol, and in order to resist 
the American and pro-American forces. 
Sihanouk called for Vietnamese troops. Once 
again, the Vietnamese came to fight side by 
side with the Khmer resistants, only to 
withdraw straight away in 1975 after the 
liberation of Phnom Penh. So it is not the 
first time that Kampuchean patriots have 
called for Vietnamese help.
What is Sihanouk's attitude to this question?
Sihanouk is a complex and changeable 
person. On the one hand, he is a feudalist 
and a paternal despot wielding a completely
personal power. On the other, he is on 
occasion a patriot. According to the 
circumstances, one side or the other may 
dominate. Until 1953 he found little difficulty 
in accepting the French protectorate and 
then Japanese domination, and then French 
tutelage again. The armed resistance 
against the French from 1945 to 1954 worried 
Sihanouk as much as it did the French. In 
1953, to check the resistance, the French 
signed an agreement which restored 
independence to Kampuchea, giving power 
to Sihanouk, who was there and then 
proclaimed as a great patriot who had seized 
independence from the hands of the French. 
From 1954 to 1975, Sihanouk did recognise 
that the great enemy of Kampuchea was 
American imperialism, which had already 
taken hold of South Viet Nam and part of 
Laos, and that he could count on Viet Nam to 
resist the American domination. He had 
enough lucidity to see that the Americans 
could not win in Indochina, but he lacked the 
courage to refuse in 1969 the renewal of 
mainly American military aid. He also 
refused to democratise political life in the 
country, concentrating all power in h is own 
hands.
Though his political cleverness allowed 
the country to keep its neutrality until 1970, 
his mistakes opened up the way for the 
manoeuvres of pro-American groups and led 
to the coup d’etat of March 1970. From 1970 
to 1975 he lived in Beijing; from 1975 to 1979 
he was the prisoner of Pol Pot, then exiled 
himself to Beijing again. Since 1970 he has 
had practically no contact with the 
Kampuchean people, for whom the most 
important thing today is to oppose the return 
of the pro-Chinese forces, whether they are 
led by Pol Pot or Khieu Samphan or 
Sihanouk. I think that the collusion between 
Beijing and Washington has deeply 
impressed him and led him to think that the 
revolutionary movement of the Indochinese 
peoples would never be able to defeat such a 
massive force.
In any case, all those in Kampuchea who 
seek foreign help to try and oppose the 
present government are doomed to failure. In 
face of the Chinese threat today, the 
Indochinese peoples are more united and 
stronger than ever.
How can one explain what happened in 
Kampuchea under Pol Pot?
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Pol Pot’s politics have two principal 
aspects: genocide at home, and war to the 
death against Viet Nam in foreign policy. 
Two factors came together to cause this: 
firstly the Pol Pot—Ieng Sary—Khieu 
Samphan group’s own political line, and 
secondly, Beijing’s projects. Briefly, it could 
he said that the Pol Pot group is made up of 
adventurists with a mixture of ideas, leftist 
and nationalist, often lunatic; the political 
support and material aid of Beijing 
unfortunately gave them the means to put 
their disastrous program into action. This 
group dreamed of:
— reforming the great Angkor Empire, 
taking back from Viet Nam the entire lower 
Mekong delta, including Ho Chi Minh city;
— carrying out a radical revolution, 
suppressing in the most brutal way 
everything which they believed to be the 
curses of the old society (money, commerce, 
the arts, religion, science, etc.) which led to 
the massacre of intellectuals, Buddhist 
monks, artists and even sportsmen.
To realise these visions they had to raise a 
large army and force the entire population to 
work day and night on huge projects, mostly 
irrigation; anyone who opposed this crazy 
policy was mercilessly done to death.
For Beijing, the Pol Pot clique was an 
instrument for attacking Viet Nam from the 
south and thus facilitating a Chinese attack 
on the northern border. A firm hold over the 
Pol Pot regime, plus the crushing of Viet 
Nam, would allow Beijing to establish its 
domination over the whole of Indochina, and 
thence to advance towards all Southeast 
Asia where 20 million Chinese already hold 
important economic positions. In 1975, Pol 
Pot possessed six divisions of 5-6,000 men 
each, with no artillery, armour nor aircraft. 
Beijing furnished arms and advisers to bring 
this army up to 23 divisions, providing it 
with heavy armaments and aeroplanes.
One can see why from May 1975 Pol Pot 
began to launch the first attacks on Viet 
Nam and why for four years he consistently 
refused all offers of negotiations made by the 
Vietnamese. Certain of Chinese support, he 
believed he could defeat Viet Nam.
The events of January 1979 are easy to 
explain: in December 1978 after the great 
floods which had ravaged our country, 
Beijing thought that Viet Nam was
Vietnamese woman and child
killed by Pol Pot forces.
completely worn out and set the Pol Pot 
troops at the attack, while Chinese troops 
were being concentrated at Viet Nam’s 
northern border. The Pol Pot attack would 
oblige the Vietnamese forces to look to the 
south and give Beijing a pretext to attack 
Viet Nam on the northern border. Deng 
Xiaping received Washington’s sanction for 
this. Both Beijing and Washington under­
estimated the strength of internal opposition 
to Pol Pot and the vitality of the Vietnamese 
revolutionary movement.
Some would reproach you for your alliance 
with the Soviet Union, your membership of 
Comecon. Perhaps China would not have 
attacked you...
Imperial China attacked us frequently 
over the centuries. France attacked us in the 
19th century, although the Soviet Union did 
not yet exist. The USA attacked us although 
we had not yet signed a treaty of friendship 
and co-operation with the USSR and were 
not yet in Comecon.
Our alliance with the USSR and our 
membership of Comecon are the logical and 
necessary consequences of the general line 
which our people and our Party have 
followed for the last 50 years. In the long and 
arduous struggle that we have been leading 
against the imperialist and reactionary 
forces, the revolutionary and progressive 
forces of the entire world have been our most 
precious allies. The Soviet Union has since 
its birth constituted the strongest support for 
the liberation movements of colonised 
peoples. Today, not only for Viet Nam, but 
also for Cuba, for Angola, for Afghanistan, 
and for all the other peoples of Asia, Africa 
and Latin America, the existence of the 
Soviet Union and other industrially 
developed socialist countries, allows under­
developed countries like Viet Nam to skip the
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stage of capitalist development and go 
directly to socialism. Material and technical 
aid and and economic and scientific co­
operation with the developed socialist 
countries are decisive factors for the 
modernisation of our economy. We entertain 
economic relations with many capitalist 
countries, but these economic relations are 
subject to the fluctuations of the market and 
to the more or less hostile policy of the 
governments. It is only in promoting organic 
co-operation with the developed socialist 
countries that we can build up our economy. 
The treaty of friendship and co-operation 
with the USSR and our membership of 
Comecon have therefore reinforced our 
national independence, politically as well as 
economically. These links don’t prevent us 
from having the most friendly relations with 
other countries like India, Algeria, Mexico, 
etc.
Is this an abandonment of the former policy of 
maintaining a balance which Viet Nam  
followed for many years, remaining linked to 
both the U S SR  and China?
Between the two partners, China and Viet 
Nam, which is it that has changed “ in its 
heart and in its guts” , as we say in 
Vietnamese? As long as the Beijing 
government was following a policy of anti­
imperialism in foreign affairs and a policy of 
reed aid to our country, we had fraternal 
relations with China, just as we did with the 
Soviet Union. We hoped for a long time that 
the disagreements between the two big 
socialist countries would eventually be 
settled. Unfortunately, the Chinese leaders 
gradually moved on to a policy of collusion 
with imperialism on the one hand, and on the 
other hand, hostility followed by agression 
towards us and towards the socialist 
countries and the progressive forces of the 
whole world. So we can’t stay half-way 
between the Chinese and Soviet positions. 
Quite independently, we took up a position 
which accords with our national interests 
and with those of the world revolutionary 
movement, a position which is in 
contradiction with that of Beijing, not 
because the latter is Chinese, but because it is 
reactionary.
Some think that the Beijing leaders are, 
however, still revolutionaries and that their 
alliance with Washington is only a tactical 
one.
A revolutionary power can follow a policy 
of temporary compromise with imperialism 
in order to avoid adventurism, but not a 
policy of systematic alliance in every 
domain, as the leaders in Beijing are doing 
today. Communists in some country or other 
can formulate reserves or criticisms of 
certain aspects of the policies of other 
countries, but not affirm that these countries 
are the bitterest enemies of humanity, the 
first to be struggled against, who must be 
punished. This sort of foreign policy is a truly 
reactionary one: there is nothing communist 
about it and it is indicative of home policy too
In the face of the Washington— Beijing axis, 
isn 't Viet N am 's position particularly  
difficult?
We don’t hide the difficulties. But as we say 
in Viet Nam, Beijing and Washington may 
sleep in the same bed, but each has its own 
dreams. Washington is looking for a market, 
raw materials and Chinese mercenaries to 
fight the USSR and the Asian revolutionary 
movements. Beijing is looking for American 
aid to increase its own power, while at the 
same time pushing the USA to war against 
the USSR, which would be China’s 
opportunity to rise from the ruins of the two 
greats as the world’s most powerful nation. 
From 1972 to 1975 we fought the military 
might of America with Beijing’s political 
support; today we face the threat of an 
eventual armed agression by China, which 
enjoys the support of Washington. But the 
Washington-Beijing alliance is rent by 
contradictions. We won in 1975 and again in
1979.
How would you assess the present situation 
between China and Viet Nam?
Large numbers of Chinese troops are being 
concentrated at our northern border. Every 
day commandos make incursions into our 
territory, carrying out sabotage, kidnapping 
or assassinating local people and officials. 
Politically, as either side of the border is 
inhabited by the same montagnard ethnic 
groups, Nung, Hmong, Zao..., the Chinese 
authorities are trying to regroup these 
peoples in order to set them against our 
government. On the sea, from the border 
down to Da Nang, Chinese naval units 
provoke incidents from time to time.
At the negotiating table, we have made 
concrete proposals: the withdrawal of troops
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to a fair distance either side of the frontier, 
establishment of a demilitarised zone with a 
joint control commission, negotiation on the 
recommencement of normal relations 
between the two countries. The Beijing side 
has laid down the precondition that the 
Vietnamese government change its policy 
towards Kampuchea and the Soviet Union 
and recognise Chinese sovereignty over the 
Hoang Sa islands (Paracels). It’s not a 
negotiating point, it’s a diktat, and it’s not 
for China to dictate our foreign policy. The 
Chinese leaders have spoken openly on 
several occasions of inflicting a second 
punishment upon Viet Nam. We are obliged 
to hold ourselves ready for any eventuality.
Let us not forget either that Beijing is 
putting very strong military pressure at the 
Laos-China border, and that all the former 
partisans and mercenaries of the various old 
pro-American parties have regrouped in 
China. Attempts at subversion of the present 
Lao government are being made in parallel 
with this military pressure at the borders; the 
possibility of an attack against Laos should 
not be ignored. As at the time of the fight 
against French and American imperialism,
Viet Nam and Laos have to co-ordinate their 
efforts. Laos has only 3 million inhabitants 
in an extensive territory with very long 
frontiers: the Lao government called on 
Vietnamese forces to help it defend itself. For 
Vietnamese fighters and technicians, to 
defend Laos, and aid it in the economic and 
technical fields, is to defend and aid Viet 
Nam itself.
In the present conditions our policy is to:
— seek to negotiate, letting escape no 
opportunity to find a peaceful solution, 
accepting any compromise so long as it 
does not sacrifice our independence and 
sovereignty. We didthisin 1946 and 1954 
with France and in 1973 with the USA;
— if combat is forced upon us, we shall take 
up the challenge and fight to the end for 
our independence and freedom. Either 
they will notice in Beijing that it is 
impossible to crush Viet Nam and will 
change their policy, as happened in 
Paris and in Washington; or, in the long 
term, the Chinese people themselves will 
force a_ change of policy towards Viet 
Nam.
